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Abstract
The aim of this article is to discuss the extent to which certain sub-
structural logics are related through the phenomenon of duality. Roughly
speaking, metainferences are inferences between collections of inferences,
and thus substructural logics can be regarded as those logics which have
fewer valid metainferences that Classical Logic. In order to investigate
duality in substructural logics, we will focus on the case study of the
logics ST and TS, the former lacking Cut, the latter Reflexivity. The
sense in which these logics, and these metainferences, are dual has yet
to be explained in the context of a thorough and detailed exposition of
duality for frameworks of this sort. Thus, our intent here is to try to
elucidate whether or not this way of talking holds some ground—specially
generalizing one notion of duality available in the specialized literature,
the so-called notion of negation duality. In doing so, we hope to hint at
broader points that might need to be addressed when studying duality in
relation to substructural logics.
1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to discuss the extent to which certain substructural log-
ics are related through the phenomenon of duality. Roughly speaking, metain-
ferences are inferences between collections of inferences, and thus substructural
logics can be regarded as those logics which have fewer valid metainferences that
Classical Logic—the logician and philosopher’s usual reference point. In par-
ticular, there are some special metainferences, the so-called “structural rules”,
which often fail in substructural logics and can be informally understood as
those features or properties of logical consequence itself, not of some specific
logical vocabulary. Usually, the list of such features includes Reflexivity, Mono-
tonicity, Contraction, and Cut—although others may deserve to be included as
well.
In order to investigate duality in substructural logics, we will focus on the
case study of the logics ST and TS, the former defended by Cobreros, E´gre´,
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Ripley, and van Rooij in works like [8], [7], [9], [10], and [23] and [24], the
latter advocated for by French in works like [15]. These logics are substruc-
tural in the aforementioned understanding, with the distinctive feature that ST
is non-transitive whereas TS is non-reflexive. Although in the seminal article
[7] both ST and TS were regarded as inferentially self-dual, in formal and in
informal contexts, scholars have pointed out to that these systems offer, metain-
ferentially speaking, dual approaches and dual solutions to the same logical and
philosophical issues—highlighting that as metainferences, Cut and Reflexivity
are also dual to each other. For example, in [15] French claims that there is a
strong duality between these approaches, and cites Ripley [24], Ho¨sli and Ja¨ger
[17], and Frankowski in [14] as implicitly or explicitly supporting this point of
view. However, the sense in which these logics and these metainferences are dual
has not been discussed in any of these works, and has thus yet to be explained
in the context of a thorough and detailed exposition of duality for frameworks
of this sort.1
Thus, our intent here is to try to elucidate whether or not this way of talking
holds some ground—specially generalizing one notion of duality available in the
specialized literature, the so-called negation duality. In doing so, we hope to
provide an account of duality for metainferences, such as Cut and Reflexivity,
and to hint at broader points that might need to be addressed when studying
duality in relation to substructural logics.
To this end, we embark on the task of providing a fully general, philosoph-
ically motivated, and technically sound way of accounting for the duality of
metainferences and for substructural logics in general. In order to do so, we
first present one notion of duality for inferential logics, the so-called negation
duality, and show that applied to ST and TS as inferential logics describes
them as self-dual, and thus as unrelated to each other. Next, we generalize this
notion to metainferences, and show that, under this generalization, ST and TS
are metainferentially dual.
For this purpose, the article is structured in the following way. In Section
2, we introduce some formal definitions that will be used throughout the whole
article. Next, in Section 3, we present the notion of negation duality (which can
be traced back to Kleene’s [19] and show that it’s not adequate for characterizing
metainferential duality. In Section 4, we provide a general definition of duality
for metainferences and for substructural logics, which allows to prove that ST
and TS are dual. In Section 4, we also show that in this new framework Cut and
Reflexivity can be taken as dual under equivalence. In Section 5, we discuss in
which sense all these positive results are based on the notion of local validity and,
appealing to [28], we show that all the results provided can be obtained using
instead a global notion. In Section 6 we explore the possibility of establishing
1It should be noted that a recently published article by Cobreros, La Rosa and Tranchini
[11] independently arrived at conclusions similar to ours, also arguing in favor of the duality
between ST and TS on different grounds that we do. Although in private conversation we
have discussed some of the similarities and differences of the notions implemented in the two
approaches, a more comprehensive study in this respect is in order. Unfortunately, carrying
this out here would lead us too far afield, and thus we hope to do it on in future work.
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the duality between ST and TS, and between Cut and Reflexivity, through
translations from metainferential logics to inferential logics, and argue against
this approach. In Section 7, we conclude with some final remarks and directions
of future work.
2 Technicalities
In this section, we provide some technical definitions concerning non-classical
logics and metainferences, that will be of use later. In the course of this
article, for L a propositional language, and FOR(L), the (algebra of) well-
formed formulae—standardly defined—we will use lowercase Greek letters for
(schematic) formulae, and uppercase Greek letters for (schematic) collections2
of formulae of L.
In this context, an inference token Γ⇒ ∆ of a language L is a pair 〈Γ,∆〉,
where Γ,∆ ⊆ FOR(L). Furthermore, a simple inference schema of a language L
is the set of all and only the inference tokens that can be obtained from one of its
members—its “basic instance”—by uniformly substituting some propositional
variable p in it by some formula ϕ. Lastly, an inference schema with contexts
is the union of a simple inference schema ρ with a subset of {〈Γ ∪ Σ,∆ ∪ Π〉 |
〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ ρ}.3 When it generates no ambiguity, we will indistinctly refer as
“schemata” to both simple schemata and to those with contexts.
To begin with, let us have a look at the rather well-known system of Classical
Logic. For this purpose, let us employ the usual notion of a (matrix) logic L,
as induced by a logical matrix M. Thus, for L a propositional language, an
L-logical matrix is a structure M = 〈A, D〉, where A is an algebra of the same
similarity type than L, and D is a subset of the universe or carrier set of A.
With regard to such a structure, an M-valuation v is an homomorphism from
FOR(L) to A. Through valuation functions, logical matrices can be used to
define logical consequence relations in the following way.
Definition 1. For an L-matrix M an M-valuation v satisfies an inference
token Γ ⇒ ∆ (written v M Γ ⇒ ∆) if and only if, if v(γ) ∈ D, for all γ ∈ Γ
then v(δ) ∈ D, for some δ ∈ ∆. An inference token Γ⇒ ∆ is M-valid (written
M Γ⇒ ∆) if and only if v M Γ⇒ ∆, for all M-valuations v.
Naturally, inference schemata areM-valid if and only if all their inference tokens
are valid. In addition, when some logic L is induced by a single matrix M,
we may interchangeably refer to M as L. This being said, we can identify
Classical Logic (CL, for short) with the (matrix) logic induced by the logical
matrix 〈B, {t}〉, where B is the usual two-element Boolean algebra counting
with elements t and f to represent truth and falsity, respectively. With respect
to Classical Logic, then, a system L will be said to be (inferentially) subclassical
2Given that our main concern are the logics ST and TS, for the most part of the article,
these collections will simply be taken to be sets of formulae. The need to consider multisets will
only briefly come into play when considering the failure of the structural rule of Contraction.
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to clarify this generalization.
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if and only if some inference schema that is valid in Classical Logic does not
hold in it.
Now, our main topic of interest in this article is non-classical logics, es-
pecially substructural logics—i.e., logics which invalidate some metainference
schema that is valid in Classical Logic, on which more will be said below. How-
ever, before presenting these sorts of non-classical frameworks, let us introduce
two more subclassical matrix logics that will be of interest when discussing the
negative or partial results on the duality of some substructural logics. These
systems are the three-valued logics LP and K3, which can be respectively seen
as the matrix logics induced by the matrices 〈SK, {t, i}〉 and 〈SK, {t}〉—where
SK is the three-element (strong) Kleene algebra defined by the so-called “truth-
tables” appearing below.
¬
t f
i i
f t
∧ t i f
t t i f
i i i f
f f f f
∨ t i f
t t t t
i t i i
f t i f
Figure 1: Strong Kleene truth-tables
In passing, and because it will be of some relevance when discussing our
target substructural systems, let us highlight some of the inferences that are
valid in CL and that are invalid in these two non-classical systems. Saliently,
LP is usually referred to as a paraconsistent logic because it invalidates the
classically-valid inference schema called Ex Falso Sequitur Quodlibet—i.e., ϕ ∧
¬ϕ ⇒—whereas K3 is usually referred to as a paracomplete logic because it
invalidates classically-valid inference schema called Tertium Non Datur—i.e.,
⇒ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
Moving on to our main target, let us first clarify now what substructural
logics are. Given the definitions that we will provide shortly, it will become
apparent why the logics of our case study—the systems ST and TS—are logics
of this kind. Let us begin by discussing what a metainference is. Intuitively
speaking, by this we mean an inference holding between inferences—instead
of the usual inferences, which relate (collections of) formulae. In this vein, a
metainference establishes that from such and such inferences, such and such
follows. That is, either another inference or inferences (in plural, as we will
discuss later in the positive sections) follow.
Formally speaking, a metainference token of a language L is a pair 〈S, s〉,
where S is a set of inference tokens and s is an inference token of L. Further-
more, a metainference schema of a language L is the set of all and only the
metainference tokens that can be obtained from one of its members—its “ba-
sic instance”—by uniformly substituting some propositional variable p in it by
some formula ϕ.
With the help of these definitions, the usual structural features of logical
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consequence can be formally reinterpreted as metainferential schemata of the
following form—in line with their usual depiction, e.g., in the context of sequent
calculi.
Reflexivity: ϕ⇒ ϕ
Contraction:
Γ, ϕ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ϕ,ϕ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Weakening:
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Cut:
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
Of vital importance for our project is the question: when does a certain
metainference token or metainference schema hold in the context of a given
logic? For the purpose of answering this, it is crucial to observe the following
definition of metainferential validity.4
Definition 2. For an L(-p, -q)-matrixM anM-valuation v satisfies a metain-
ference token 〈S, s〉 if and only if, if v satisfies all the inference tokens in S,
then v satisfies the inference token s. A metainference token 〈S, s〉 is (locally)
M-valid if and only if all M-valuations satisfy it.
Naturally, again, a metainference schema is valid if and only if all its instances
are. Therefore, let us define a substructural logic as a logic where some metain-
ference that is valid in Classical Logic does not hold.
With all of these elements in place, let us present our target logics ST and
TS. Proof-theoretically, these systems can be—respectively—seen as Cut-free
and Reflexivity-free versions of Classical Logic, where Cut and Reflexivity are
not derivable. More interesting to us, though, is the semantic introduction of
these logics. Since they are substructural, they will not be definable in terms
of standard logical matrices—i.e., it will not be possible to induce them with
the help of such structures. However, Malinowski [20] first and Frankowski
[13] later defined algebraic structures that generalize the notion of a logical
matrix and that are capable of rendering substructural logics of the desired
kind. In particular, Malinowski defined q-matrices which appropriately induce
non-reflexive logics, whereas Frankowski defined p-matrices which accordingly
induce non-transitive logics.
More concretely, for L a propositional language, an L-p-matrix is a struc-
ture 〈A,D+,D−〉, where A is an algebra of the same similarity type as L, and
D+,D− ⊆ V and D+ ⊆ D−. With regard to such structures, valuations (as stan-
dardly defined, previously) can be used to define logical consequence relations
4The definitions of an L-p-matrix and L-q-matrix are provided below.
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in the following way.5
Definition 3. For an L-p-matrix M an M-valuation v satisfies an inference
token Γ ⇒ ∆ (written v M Γ ⇒ ∆) if and only if, if v(γ) ∈ D+, for all
γ ∈ Γ then v(δ) ∈ D−, for some δ ∈ ∆. An inference token Γ⇒ ∆ is M-valid
(written M Γ⇒ ∆) if and only if v M Γ⇒ ∆, for all M-valuations v.
Moreover, for L a propositional language, an L-q-matrix is a structure
〈A,D+,D−〉, where A is an algebra of the same similarity type as L, and
D+,D− ⊆ V and D+ ∩ D− = ∅. Once again, with regard to such structures,
valuations (as standardly defined, previously) can be used to define logical con-
sequence relations in the following way.
Definition 4. For an L-q-matrix M an M-valuation v satisfies an inference
token Γ ⇒ ∆ (written v M Γ ⇒ ∆) if and only if, if v(γ) /∈ D−, for all
γ ∈ Γ then v(δ) ∈ D+, for some δ ∈ ∆. An inference token Γ⇒ ∆ is M-valid
(written M Γ⇒ ∆) if and only if v M Γ⇒ ∆, for all M-valuations v.
Naturally, inference schemata areM-valid in either p- or q-matrices if and only
if all their inference tokens are valid.
In this vein, we can simply present our target substructural logics ST and
TS as induced, respectively, by the p-matrix 〈SK, {t}, {t, i}〉 and the q-matrix
〈SK, {t}, {f}〉—where SK is the three-element (strong) Kleene algebra. Given
theses definitions, it is straightforward to observe that ST has the same valid
inferences that Classical Logic, whereas TS has no valid inferences at all (if the
language does not count with truth-constants for the truth-values t or f).
More importantly—recalling our definition of metainferential validity from a
few paragraphs back—it can be easily observed that both systems are substruc-
tural. The special and distinctive feature of ST being that it is non-transitive
(meaning that the metainference called Cut does not hold in it), while TS is
non-reflexive (meaning that the metainference called Reflexivity does not hold
in it).
With all these pieces in place, let us now proceed to the discussion of duality,
and to the assessment of how it resonates in the context of the non-classical logics
that we just introduced.
5A word on how q- and p-matrices generalize the usual notion of a logical matrix is in order.
In a usual logical matrix 〈V,D,O〉 the truth-values of the matrix, i.e. the elements of V, are
presented in a dichotomized way. By this we mean that they either belong to D—and, hence,
are designated—or they belong to V \ D—and, hence, are anti-designated. Contrary to this,
q- and p-matrices start from a non-dichotomized classification of the truth-values of the given
matrix—i.e. the members of V—letting them belong to two sets, which we here call D+ and
D− (we adopt this terminology—i.e. talk of D+ and D−—introduced by [27], emphasizing
that we will take q- and p-logics to be induced by different type of structures, i.e. respectively
q- and p-matrices. In this vein, what will be distinctive of these type of structures will be the
properties of the sets D+ and D−, as detailed previously.) We will, then, allow these sets to
be jointly non-exhaustive and mutually non-exclusive. Paradigmatically, the first note of this
generalization is associated with q-matrices, where it is allowed that D+ ∪ D− 6= V (see e.g.
[20, p. 12]). Analogously, the second note of this generalization is associated with p-matrices,
where it is allowed that D+ ∩ D− 6= ∅ (see e.g. [13, p. 45]).
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3 Duality in the logico-philosophical literature
In this section, we introduce the notion of duality we will be focusing on through-
out this article, namely the notion of negation duality. This will allow us to
evaluate whether employing it leads to establishing the desired type of connec-
tion between the inferences of ST and of TS, and to prepare the ground for its
generalization to metainferences such as Cut and Reflexivity.6
Before going to this notion, a few words on the general concept of duality
are in order. The notion of duality is very widespread in many fields of thought.
In this respect, in [1, p.1] Atiyah says that fundamentally “duality gives two
different points of view of looking at the same object”, attributing its origin
in mathematics and physics to the invention of projective geometry. Projective
planes can be defined by points, lines and an incidence relation, but also by lines,
points and the inverse of this relation.7 With the process of algebraization of
logic which began in the XIX century, the interest in these sorts of structures
was transposed to logic. Its first appearance is attributed to Schro¨der’s [26],
and also Kleene refers to Hilbert and Ackermann, and Church in [16, p.15-16]
and [6, pp.106-107], respectively.
Kleene himself took a stab at this phenomenon in [19, p.23], with the anal-
ysis of the alleged duality between the logical operations of conjunction and
disjunction in the context of Classical Logic. Dear to Kleene’s reflections, it
appears, is the idea that the opposition between truth and falsity is at the core
of the notion of duality in logic and that negation is the tool we may use to
express implicit relations of duality of this sort. To wit, observe the following
story that he uses to motivate the duality between disjunction and conjunction:
Suppose a visitor from Mars is confused by what he observes upon
his arrival on Earth and mistakes our true “t” for false “F”(...).
Then our table for & would for him be read as our table for ∨ for
us, and vice versa.
He then, goes on to analyze what such a Martian would be doing, in confusing
things in that peculiar way. For this purpose he appeals to an elucidation of
the duality of two truth-functions f and f ′ saying that they are duals whenever
f(x1, . . . , xm) = y if and only if f
′(n(x1), . . . , n(xm)) = n(y)—where the func-
tion n(x) = 1−x represents the negation of each input. If we have this in mind,
then, it is easy to check that conjunction and disjunction are duals in Classical
6There are, indeed, other notions of duality defined in the literature, e.g., those defined by
Humberstone in [18, p. 93], which we may call connective-duality and converse-duality. As
an anonymous reviewer has suggested, presenting these notions in full detail would deviate us
too much from our main point, which is the generalization of the notion of negation duality
to substructural logics. Therefore, we leave a deeper exploration of these definitions and their
related applications to the target systems for future work.
7Thus, as is well known, truths about a plane can be obtained from those about its dual
plane, interchanging the words “point” and “line” and inverting the relation—thus, preserving
theoremhood. For instance: Two points can be joined by a unique line and Two lines meet
in one point.
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Logic, and that the Martian is only dualizing their truth-functions, through the
application of negation.8
In what follows, we will see that as regards consequence relations or validity
claims, negation can also play an important role in establishing their duality. In
fact, negation lays at the core of a widespread conception of duality that we call
negation duality below. This account exploits the idea that negation may be the
lens or medium through which we could be able to project the duality between
truth and falsity, using it to surface the further duality between consequence
relations or logical systems.
The core of the idea of negation duality is, given an inference, to move
all of the formulas from premises to conclusions, and vice versa, and replace
them by their negations. The motivation for proceeding in this way can be
drawn from a close inspection of the usual understanding of logical consequence.
Indeed, if logical consequence is understood as either truth-preservation (from
premises to conclusions) or as falsity-preservation (from conclusion to premises),
then an interesting question may arise. Given some logic L endowed with a
certain semantics, there might be some inferences which according to the usual
interpretation of such semantics are backward falsity-preserving, but which are
nevertheless deemed as invalid by the corresponding apparatus. If this is the
case, then, one may ask if it is possible to find a system where all the missed
falsity-preserving inferences are accounted for. We may call this system the
negation dual of L.9
This being said, let ¬ : FOR(L) −→ FOR(L) be a function that maps each
formula ϕ to its negation ¬ϕ, letting ¬(Γ) = {¬γ | γ ∈ Γ}, for Γ ⊆ FOR(L).
Definition 5. The negation dual of an inference token Γ⇒ ∆ is the inference
token ¬(∆)⇒ ¬(Γ).
Once again, an inference schema is the negation dual of another if and only
if each of the inference tokens of one of them has a negation dual that is an
inference token of the other. Furthermore, a logic L is negation dual to a logic
L¬ if and only if all inference schemata valid in L have negation dual inference
schemata that hold in L¬ and vice versa.
It should be highlighted that, as is easy to notice, this notion renders K3
and LP negation duals, and that the relation of duality holding between them
is involutive—that is, the negation dual of the negation dual of K3 (that is,
8Notice that in the case where f is the truth-function associated with Boolean negation, its
dual f ′ is also the truth-function associated with Boolean negation. In other words, we could
say that negation is self dual. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for providing
us with these historical references and this abstract idea of duality.
9For example, according to the usual paraconsistent understanding of LP, the inference
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ⇒ ψ is invalid because ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ can be true (because ϕ can be both true and false)
without ψ being true. However, the same understanding would indicate that ϕ∧¬ϕ is always
false, thereby implying that the inference ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ⇒ ψ preserves falsity from conclusion to
premises—which, for some, may be sufficient for its validity. In such a case, since its validity is
not recognized within LP one may wonder which is the system that validates all the backward
falsity-preserving inferences of LP. The answer, as advertised previously, is K3. Similar
considerations apply, in the case of ψ ⇒ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, for K3 and LP.
8
LP) is K3, and similarly for LP. However, under this notion of duality Ex
Falso Sequitur Quodlibet and Tertium Non Datur are not negation duals to
each other. Instead, the negation dual of the former is ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ⇒, whereas
the negation dual of the latter is ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ). It is true, though, that in
the context of LP the inference schema ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ⇒ is logically equivalent
to Ex Falso Sequitur Quodlibet, whereas in the context of K3 the inference
schema ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) is logically equivalent to Tertium Non Datur. So, in a
way, these inference schemata can be regarded as negation duals modulo logical
equivalence.10
Nevertheless, with regard to our target substructural logics this notion is
useless, since it links every inference valid in a logic to a corresponding negation
dual inference that is also valid in the same logic:
Fact 6. ST is self-negation dual, and TS is self-negation dual.
Proof. Let us see the case of ST. Let us take any valid inference Γ ⇒ ∆ valid
in ST. Thus, for every valuation, v, either v(γ) ∈ {f , i} for some γ ∈ Γ, or
v(δ) ∈ {i, t}, for some δ ∈ ∆. Thus, using the tables for negation, for every
valuation either v(¬γ) ∈ {t, i} for some γ ∈ Γ, or v(¬δ) ∈ {i, f}, for some
δ ∈ ∆. Therefore, ¬(∆)⇒ ¬(Γ) is a valid inference in ST. The case for TS is
analogous.
This result coincides with the original idea of Cobreros et al. in [7], where the
authors explicitly state the self-duality of these logics. In the same line, there is
another interesting way of thinking about the self-duality of the inferences of ST
and TS, which is a more abstract way of taking the idea of negation duality as
applied to the semantics and may also be related to Kleene’s ideas. As suggested
by an anonymous reviewer, let us say (as in [5]) that a set of truth-values A is in
a p-relation R to some other set B provided either some ai ∈ A does not belong
to D+ or some bj ∈ B belongs to D−—and similarly for a q-relation.11 In this
vein, we could define the dual relation R′ to R as determined by the fact that
either some ai ∈ A is such that n(ai) does not belong to the set n(D+) made
of negations of values in D+, or some bj ∈ B is such that n(bj) belongs to the
set n(D−) of negations of values in D−.
Now, applying this general idea to the case of R being the ST-consequence
relation (or similarly to TS), it’s easy to check that it is in fact self-dual. By
definition, D+ = {t} and D− = {t, i}, so if we take an ST-valid inference
Γ ⇒ ∆ then for every valuation v, there is some γ ∈ Γ such that v(γ) /∈ D+
or there is some δ ∈ ∆ such that v(δ) ∈ D−. So, defining the function n(x)
as the Strong Kleene negation, the dual of the ST-consequence relation is such
that for every valuation v, there is some γ ∈ Γ such that v(¬γ) /∈ n(D+) = {f}
or there is some δ ∈ ∆ such that v(¬δ) ∈ n(D−) = {f , i}. Thus, there is some
δ ∈ ∆ such that v(¬δ) /∈ D+ or there is some γ ∈ Γ such that v(¬γ) ∈ D−, and
10We will go back to this point in the next Section.
11This is another way of stating our Definition 3 of the previous Section.
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therefore ¬∆ and ¬Γ are in the ST-consequence relation. Similarly, for TS.12
Finally, there is not an obvious way of extending this concept to metain-
ferences, since negation is not involved in either Cut or Reflexivity, rendering
both self-negation dual. Then, one may ask if there is a way of generalizing the
notion of negation duality that we can come up with that serves this purpose.
Indeed, we believe there is.
4 Duality for metainferences
In the previous section, we introduced the notion of negation duality, and showed
that it is not entirely satisfactory to provide the desired duality results between
the substructural logics ST and TS, and between the structural schematic
metainferences Cut and Reflexivity. In this section we embrace the task of
providing philosophical and technical means to flesh out the intuitions claiming
that these are in fact dual.
In order to do this, we will draw inspiration from the notion of negation
duality. This will lead us to a necessary modification of the way we look at
metainferences or, equivalently, to an extension of the framework in which we
study metainferences. These changes will be of two sorts. On the one hand, we
will allow metainferences to have multiple conclusions—that is, sets (including
the empty set) of inferences as conclusions. On the other hand, we will allow
for inferences to be of two sorts: positive and negative. Negative inferences will
represent the negation of regular (positive) inferences—in a sense to be made
clear, shortly. With the help of these elements, we will introduce a novel notion
of metainferential duality. In light of this definition, we will properly show that,
according to our intuitions, ST and TS are metainferentially dual. Interestingly
enough, we will also show that similarly to what happens to the link between
Ex Falso Sequitur Quodlibet and Tertium Non Datur, Cut and Reflexivity are
not properly speaking metainferentially dual—although they can be regarded
as duals modulo equivalence.
First, notice that in order to find the negation dual of an inference token the
notion of negation duality requires us to flip around premises and conclusions.
Thus, the negation dual of an inference token with multiple (i.e., with a set
of) premises will be an inference token with multiple conclusions. Similarly,
the kind of dual that we will be studying hereafter is such that the metainfer-
ential dual of a metainference token with multiple premises will necessarily be
a metainference token with a set of conclusions. This is why we will need to
change our framework.
Let us remark that, besides the purpose of this particular investigation, there
seem to be good reasons to admit this extension. After all, we permit multiple
conclusions in the context of inferences holding between (collections of) for-
mulae. So, if metainferences (as argued in [4]) are inferences holding between
different kinds of relata—in this case, inferences themselves—then there appears
12We owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for providing us with this more abstract way
of showing the self duality of these logics at the inferential level.
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to be no reason to disallow multiple conclusions in this case but not in the other.
Is there anything in particular about inferences as relata of inferences themselves
that prevents us from having a unified picture, where both premises and con-
clusions can be sets? We cannot think of a reason thereof and so, in absence
of grounds to refrain from this generalization, we consider it to be acceptable.
Furthermore, since premises and meta premises are read conjunctively, conclu-
sions and meta conclusions should be read disjunctively. Intuitively speaking,
the separation between the premises (conclusions) of a metainference plays the
same role that the commas in a premise (conclusion) of an inference—something
that will be salient in the definition of satisfaction for metainferences that we
detail below.
Secondly, notice that in order to find the negation dual of an inference token
the notion of negation duality requires that we map each formula belonging to
the premise set to its negation, and analogously for each formula of the conclu-
sion set. Thus, we need some sort of surrogate of negation that will appropriately
apply to the relata of metainferences—that is, to inferences themselves. In other
words, we need to find a cogent and perspicuous way to negate inferences. In the
context of our discussion, this requires providing some syntactic and semantic
details.
Regarding the former, we will start by calling “positive inferences” the reg-
ular inference tokens of the form Γ ⇒ ∆, now alternatively denoting them by
Γ⇒+ ∆. In this vein, we will denote by Γ⇒− ∆ the negative inference that can
be considered the “negation” of the positive or regular inference Γ⇒+ ∆. Con-
versely, we may also call Γ ⇒+ ∆ the “negation” of Γ ⇒− ∆, taking negation
for inferences to be involutive—something that will be salient when we discuss
the semantic reading of negative inferences.
Regarding the latter, that is, the way in which satisfaction should be under-
stood for negative inferences, we should say the following. Just like formula-
negation operates at the formula-level, toggling between truth and falsity, we
will let inference-negation operate at the meta-level, affecting the inference sat-
isfaction conditions. While the satisfaction conditions for a positive inference
in a given valuation consist in the fact that if all premises receive a designated
value, then so do some of the conclusions, the satisfaction conditions for the
corresponding negative inference invert that to a relevant extent. Thus, a val-
uation satisfies its corresponding negative inference if and only if it assigns a
designated value to each premise and it assigns a non-designated value to each
conclusion. We can visualize this more formally in the definition below.13
Definition 7. For an L-matrix M an M-valuation v satisfies a negative in-
ference token Γ ⇒− ∆, in symbols v M Γ ⇒− ∆, if and only if v(γ) ∈ D,
for every γ ∈ Γ, and v(δ) /∈ D, for every δ ∈ ∆. A negative inference token
Γ ⇒− ∆ is M-valid (written M Γ ⇒− ∆) if and only if v M Γ ⇒− ∆, for
all M-valuations v.
Notice that by a simple inspection of the satisfaction conditions, a valuation
13We would like to thank an anonymous referee for asking us to clarify this point.
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v satisfies a negated inference Γ ⇒− ∆ if and only if it satisfies all of the
members of the following set of positive inferences {⇒+ γ, δ ⇒+}, for every
γ ∈ Γ and δ ∈ ∆. This is so, because for a valuation v, v(ϕ) ∈ D if and only if
v M⇒+ ϕ, and v(ϕ) /∈ D if and only if v M ϕ⇒+.
We would like to highlight that in a classical setting, the satisfaction con-
ditions for a negative inference correspond to the counterexamplification condi-
tions of the corresponding positive inference. This equivalence can be reflected
by the fact that our newly introduced negation for inferences satisfies certain
principles that we may analogously refer to as Exclusion and Exhaustion—to
parallel what happens at the level of negation for formulae. Thus, in Classical
Logic the following holds, for every Boolean valuation v.
Exclusion: not (v  Γ⇒+ ∆ and v  Γ⇒− ∆)
Exhaustion: v  Γ⇒+ ∆ or v  Γ⇒− ∆
In this spirit, it is interesting to observe that negation for inferences can be
as non-classical as negation for formulae can be. Indeed, just like some non-
classical systems allow for some formula and its negation to be both true and
false, while other systems allow for some formula and its negation to be neither
true nor false, we may have non-classical logics that treat inferences and their
negations in a similar way. In other words, although every Boolean valuation
satisfies either the positive-inference or its corresponding negative-inference, but
not both, there may be some logics allowing for positive inferences of the form
Γ ⇒+ ∆ and negative inferences of the form Γ ⇒− ∆ to be both satisfied at
the same time (violating Exclusion) whereas some other systems may allow for
neither of them to be satisfied (violating Exhaustion).
Actually, as we will see, this is what happens once we take into account
p-logics and q-logics, especially ST and TS. However, in order to see this,
we need to define the conditions of satisfaction of a positive inference and of
its corresponding negative inference, generalizing the Definition 7. To carry
out this generalization, we have to pay attention to the fact that in p- and q-
logics we have two different sets of designated values—thus, the generalizations
should be sensible to those particularities. For this purpose, let us first adapt
the Definition 7 for p−logics and q−logics, as we did in Definitions 3 and 4 for
positive inferences:
Definition 8. For an L-p-matrix M an M-valuation v satisfies a negative
inference token Γ ⇒− ∆, in symbols v M Γ ⇒− ∆, if and only if v(γ) ∈ D−,
for all γ ∈ Γ, and v(δ) /∈ D+ for all δ ∈ ∆. As before, a negative inference
token Γ⇒− ∆ is M-valid (written M Γ⇒− ∆) if and only if v M Γ⇒− ∆,
for all M-valuations v.
Definition 9. For an L-q-matrix M an M-valuation v satisfies a negative
inference token Γ ⇒− ∆, in symbols v M Γ ⇒− ∆, if and only if v(γ) ∈ D+,
for all γ ∈ Γ, and v(δ) ∈ D− for all δ ∈ ∆. As before, a negative inference
token Γ⇒− ∆ is M-valid (written M Γ⇒− ∆) if and only if v M Γ⇒− ∆,
for all M-valuations v.
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Notice that in this case too, the effect is the same as in the Definition 7, a
valuation v satisfies a negated inference Γ ⇒− ∆ if and only if it satisfies the
set of positive inferences {⇒+ γ, δ ⇒+}, for every γ ∈ Γ and δ ∈ ∆. Let us
see this for p-logics. For any valuation, v ⇒+ γ if and only if v(γ) ∈ D−, and
v  δ ⇒+ if and only if v(δ) /∈ D+. The case of q-logics is similar.
As advertised, observing negative inferences in the context of p- and q-logics
like ST and TS allows to surface cases where negation for inferences displays
a certain non-classical behavior—thus, not complying with the Exclusion or
Exhaustion clauses depicted above. To observe this, consider a (positive or
negative) inference Γ⇒+/− ∆ and take a strong Kleene valuation v, where for
all propositional variables p, v(p) = i. Then, v(Γ) = v(∆) = i. Such a valuation
satisfies both Γ⇒+ ∆ and Γ⇒− ∆ in ST, but does not satisfy neither Γ⇒+ ∆
nor Γ ⇒− ∆ in TS. Some could, following the path initiated by [3], see this
as a sort of revelation of the paraconsistent nature of ST and the paracomplete
nature of TS, but we will not discuss this issue at length here.
Now, with the help of these modifications to the metainferential framework,
we are in a position to describe what a metainference token and a metainfer-
ence schema are, in this new sense and—most importantly—to precisely state
when two metainferences are dual, which will lead us to understand when two
logics are metainferentially dual. In this line, we will say that a metainference
token of the language L is a pair 〈S1, S2〉, where S1 and S2 are sets that may
contain both positive and negative inference tokens of L. So, a metainference
schema of a language L is the set of all and only metainference tokens that
can be obtained from one of its members—its “basic instance”—by uniformly
substituting some propositional variable p in it by some formula ϕ. For these
sorts of metainferences which can relate both positive and negative inferences,
we define validity as follows.
Definition 10. For an L(-p, -q)-matrix M an M-valuation v satisfies a
metainference token 〈S1, S2〉 if and only if v satisfies all the inference tokens
in S1 only if v satisfies some of the inference tokens in S2. A metainference
token 〈S1, S2〉 is (locally) M-valid if and only if all M-valuations satisfy it.
As before, satisfaction and validity can be defined for metainference schemata,
i.e., a metainference schema is valid if and only if all its instances are. Intuitively
speaking, a metainference has the following form.14
Γ1 ⇒+/− ∆1 . . . Γn ⇒+/− ∆n . . .
Σ1 ⇒+/− Π1 . . . Σm ⇒+/− Πm . . .
where ⇒+/− stands either for ⇒+ or for ⇒−.
Definition 11. The metainferential-dual of the metainference token
14Notice that in the definition S2 can be the empty set. In this case, we take it to represent
something like a meta-level falsum—intuitively speaking, representing the fact that everything
(i.e., every set of positive and negative inferences) follows from S1.
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Γ1 ⇒+/− ∆1 . . . Γn ⇒+/− ∆n . . .
Σ1 ⇒+/− Π1 . . . Σm ⇒+/− Πm . . .
is the metainference token
Σ1 ⇒−/+ Π1 . . . Σm ⇒−/+ Πm . . .
Γ1 ⇒−/+ ∆1 . . . Γn ⇒−/+ ∆n . . .
where −/+ means that we replace each ⇒+ by a ⇒− and vice versa.
Once more, a metainference schema is the metainferential-dual of another if
and only if each of the metainference tokens of the former has a metainferential-
dual that is a metainference token of the latter. Furthermore, a logic L1 is
metainferential-dual to a logic L2 if and only if all metainference schemata valid
in L1 have metainferential-duals that holds in L2. Notice that this definition
already exhibits clearly the fact that we are generalizing the notion of negation
duality, conceived for inferences: we flip the role of premises and conclusions
and map each object—in this case, each inference—to its negation.
Having presented this novel approach, we will now proceed to discuss the
extent to which ST and TS, as well as Cut and Reflexivity can be said to be
metainferentially dual. In this respect, let us highlight that, happily, we have
a positive answer to the question about the duality of ST and TS—as the
following theorem shows.
Theorem 12. ST and TS are metainferentially dual.
Proof. A metainference token
Γ1 ⇒+/− ∆1 . . . Γn ⇒+/− ∆n . . .
Σ1 ⇒+/− Π1 . . . Σm ⇒+/− Πm . . .
is valid in ST (TS) if and only if for every valuation v, either it does not
satisfy one of the positive or negative premise-inferences, or it satisfies one of
the positive or negative conclusion-inferences. It is straightforward to check
that a valuation v does not satisfy a positive inference Γi ⇒+ ∆i according to
ST (TS) if and only if it satisfies the negative inference Γi ⇒− ∆i according to
TS (ST), and that it does not satisfy a negative inference Γi ⇒− ∆i according
to ST (TS) if and only if it satisfies the positive inference Γi ⇒+ ∆i according
to TS (ST). Thus, the previous metainference token is valid in ST (TS) if and
only if the following metainference token, which is the metainferential dual of
the one outlined above
Σ1 ⇒−/+ Π1 . . . Σm ⇒−/+ Πm . . .
Γ1 ⇒−/+ ∆1 . . . Γn ⇒−/+ ∆n . . .
is valid in TS (ST).
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In line with the corroboration of the duality holding between ST and TS,
one would also expect that, just as in the inferential case, CL turns out to be
metainferentially self-dual. This turns out to be the case, as is easy to check.
Moving on now to the question of whether or not Cut and Reflexivity are
metainferentially dual, we must advance that our answer to this issue is not as
nice as one would intuitively expect it to be. To understand what we mean by
this, let us start by applying the previously defined notions to the simple instance
of Cut, Here formulated in an even simpler form, with an empty conclusion,
which is now allowed by the new framework:
⇒+ p p⇒+
If a logic validates it, its dual logic must validate the following:
⇒− p p⇒−
which, strictly speaking, is not Reflexivity:
p⇒+ p
but they are equivalent.15 The other way around, if a logic validates Reflexivity
in the following form:
p⇒+ p
its dual logic must validate the following:
p⇒− p
which is not Cut. However, it is equivalent to:16
⇒+ p p⇒+
So, as a result of our definitions, strictly speaking Cut and Reflexivity are not
dual, and the duality between Cut and Reflexivity holds under equivalence (they
are dual to metainferences which are logically equivalent).
One could argue that this is not enough, since any other equivalent metain-
ference would be dual in this sense. However, this is not something peculiar to
this case. Actually, as we previously said, we are developing a kind of negation
duality for metainferences, and something similar happens between Excluded
Middle and Explosion, regarding the notion of negation duality for inferences.
15Using the definition of a negative inference, a valuation v does not satisfy the dual metain-
ference of this instance of Cut if and only if it does not satisfy ⇒+ p and it does not satisfy
p⇒+. In any logic in which this is the case, such a valuation will be a counterexample to the
instance of Reflexivity p⇒+ p. And similarly in the other way around.
16Again, using the definition of a negative inference, a valuation v does not satisfy the dual
metainference of this instance of Reflexivity if and only if it satisfies ⇒+ p and p⇒+. In any
logic in which this is the case, such a valuation will be a counterexample to the instance of
the corresponding instance of Cut. And similarly in the other way around.
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Let us recall that according to Definition 5 given an inference Γ⇒ ∆ its negation
dual is ¬(∆) ⇒ ¬(Γ). However, contrary to what one would expect, Excluded
Middle and Explosion are negation dual, only under equivalence (in the logics
K3 and LP). Therefore, under one of the most employed definitions of inferen-
tial duality—what we call negation duality) Excluded Middle and Explosion are
dual only under equivalence, in the same sense as the new duality established
between the instance of Cut without contexts and Reflexivity.
We would like to stay open about what should be the moral of this discus-
sion. Perhaps, there is something special about these equivalences or, perhaps,
yet another notion of metainferential duality is needed in order to capture the
duality between Cut and Reflexivity.17
5 A word on global validity for metainferences
Throughout this article, we focused on one particular definition of metainferen-
tial validity—denoted “local”—that determined whether or not certain metain-
ferences (like Cut and Reflexivity) hold in the context of a given logic. Thus,
one may wonder how dependent on this notion our results are. In what follows
we show two things. First, that the duality result can be extended to apply to a
generalization of what is known as the global notion of metainferential validity
implemented, e.g., in [2]. The key to this will be the fact that both concepts
can be made to collapse. The second thing we will argue is that there is some
technical convenience in using the local definition, as we have done up until this
point.
We need to start then by providing the aforesaid generalization of the usual
definition of Global validity, in order for it to fit our particular framework. The
problem is that there are more than one possible way to do it, depending on
how we quantify over valuations. The first choice is the most natural one, which
is preservation of validity:
Definition 13. For an L(-p, -q)-matrix M a metainference token 〈S1, S2〉 is
globally valid if and only if either some valuation does not satisfy some inference
token in S1 or some inference token is satisfied by all valuations in S2.
Unfortunately, doing things this way, we face a problem. In the standard
framework, the most basic link between metainferential validities consists on
the fact that locally valid metainferences are a subset of the globally valid ones.
This can be illustrated by the following schema, which is classically locally valid,
but globally invalid under the previous definition, given that not all formulae
are either classical tautologies or classical contradictions:
Thus, we offer this alternative version:
17Of course, a further point is related with what we are calling Cut in this section. Here,
we are considering only one special instance of Cut (without context and without conclusion),
so everything that we have been saying only applies to this case and we expect to expand on
it in future works.
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⇒+
ψ ⇒+ ⇒+ ψ
Definition 14. For an L(-p, -q)-matrix M a metainference token 〈S1, S2〉 is
globally valid if and only if either some valuation does not satisfy some inference
token in S1 or all valuations satisfy some inference token in S2.
Notice that even though the first disjunct stays as it was in Definition 13,
the second one now asks for the conclusions to be satisfied “collectively”, so
to speak, by every valuation. The main disadvantage is that there is nothing
being preserved here, and hence, this is a somewhat more artificial concept.
However, it has two redeeming qualities. The first one is that it coincides with
standard global validity in the limit, single-conclusion case, and thus, it counts
as a generalization thereof. The second one is that now we regain the inclusion
relation: if a metainference is globally invalid in this sense, all premises are valid
but there is one valuation that satisfies no conclusion, and that valuation serves
as a local counterexample.
In the second place, we want to show that this relation can be turned into an
identity. If one only considers metainference tokens, then the inclusion between
the two concepts is strict: any token with invalid premises will be globally valid.
However, if it is metainference schemata that are under analysis, things change.
In the standard framework, these two notions easily collapse in languages that
are rich enough—as argued in [28]. One straightforward sufficient condition for
the collapse is precisely the inclusion of truth-constants for the truth-values of
the semantic structure inducing the logic in question, which in the case of TS
and ST can be incorporated without issue. As an illustration, consider how the
following schemata, which are globally valid but locally invalid according to TS
and ST respectively:
⇒+ ϕ
ψ ⇒+ ψ
⇒+ ϕ ϕ⇒+
⇒+
become globally invalid by the introduction of a t-constant > and i-constant λ,
as they acquire as tokens the global TS and ST-counterexamples below:
⇒+ >
p⇒+ p
⇒+ λ λ⇒+
⇒+
What we want to know in order to extend our duality result is whether the
collapse also holds in the modified framework. The answer is that it does. The
introduction of truth constants allows us to have, for each locally invalid schema,
an instance where the premises are valid and the conclusion is not. The trick in
the proof—as can be guessed from the example above—consists in mimicking
the assignments of the local counterexample with formulas that get that value
in every valuation. The proof in the new framework works in the exact same
way.
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So for the remainder of this section, let us grant that our base language
is indeed enriched with all truth-constants. Thus, the following follows from
Theorem 12:
Theorem 15. ST and TS are globally metainferentially dual.
Proof. Let S be a metainference schema which is globally invalid in ST (TS).
Thus, there is a token St which is globally invalid in ST (TS). By the inclusion
of global invalidity in local invalidity, St is also locally invalid in ST (TS). Thus,
by the theorem 12, its dual Sdt is locally invalid in TS (ST). Thus, the dual of
S, Sd has a locally invalid instance in TS (ST). Hence, because of the collapse
of local and global schemata, Sd has a globally invalid instance in TS (ST).
Hence, Sd is globally invalid in TS.
Whence, unless one has a motive against considering schemata, or against
enriching the language, the choice between local and global validity is mostly a
matter of convenience. People have certainly put forward a variety of reasons
against those things. For instance, [12] believe the focus should be made on
metainference tokens. And although we do think schemata are of crucial impor-
tance, in the context of our present discussion, we believe there is some weight
in favor of working with local validity, the way we did.
First of all, we want to point out that one reason to be interested in duals at
all has to do with the fact that the information one learns about something can
often be turned into information about that thing’s dual. Thus for example, if
we know the logic K3 lacks tautologies, and that LP is its dual, we can infer
that LP lacks contradictions, which is the dual property. Of course, this will
not hold for any property whatsoever, but if we are dealing with logical duality,
it is reasonable to expect that logical properties will be preserved.
However, even though Theorem 15 guarantees duality for schemata, Global
validity is not preserved token-to-token. In particular, if a schema is globally
invalid, then it will have tokens which are globally valid in TS but their duals
are invalid in ST.18
Put another way, the counterexample relation between tokens and schemata
is not preserved through duality. The reason is that most metainference schemata
have what we will call “vacuous tokens”—i.e., metainference tokens where global
validity is preserved merely because the premises of the metainference are in-
valid inferences. Take as an illustration the ST-invalid schema to the left, and
its TS-invalid dual to the right:
⇒+ ϕ
⇒+ ψ
⇒− ψ
⇒− ϕ
Even though the following token to the left is a global ST-counterexample
to the first schema, the TS-counterexample to its dual is not the token to the
right, which is vacuously TS-valid :
18Recall that, in the proof, the invalid instance need not be the same.
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⇒+ p ∨ ¬p
⇒+ q
⇒− q
⇒− p ∨ ¬p
To get a TS-counterexample, one necessarily needs to use a truth constant:
⇒− ⊥
⇒− p
Summing up these reflections, we can take away the following conclusions.
First, that using Local metainferential validity—instead of Global validity—
allows us to nicely pair metainferences such that duality holds not only for
metainference schemata, but also point-wise for metainference tokens. This
might come as no surprise, since Local validity makes finer-grained distinctions
among metainference tokens which are globally valid in a vacuous way, and is
thus better suited to work with tokens. Second, that at least from a formal
point of view, there is no strong dependence of the duality results on the local
definition, at least for cases where we have truth-constants and are comparing
schemata.
6 An alternative: duality via translations
Up to now, we have been focused on our proposal about metainferential duality
which ultimately led us to establish the duality between ST and TS. In this
respect, one may wonder whether similar results could be established through
the implementation of some representation theorems recently proved for these
substructural logics. The aim of this section is to explore this alternative, and
to assess its advantages and disadvantages, in relation to our own proposal
defended above. Given that the results we use in this section are proved for
a framework without negative inferences and with metainferences with single
conclusions, in what follows we will work within that framework.
For this purpose, we will examine the prospects of combining two sorts of
technical results. On the one hand, the previously discussed fact that LP and
K3 are negation duals of each other. On the other hand, the deep connection
between ST and LP (and, concomitantly, between TS and K3) noticed by [22]
and [2], and reconstructed in [12]. The latter refers to the fact that—under
somehow reasonable translations—it is possible to correlate the (locally) valid
metainferences of ST exactly with the valid inferences of LP, and similarly for
TS and K3. These representation theorems can be proved by several means,
with some minor differences in the way different authors present this issue—all
irrelevant to our point. For this purpose, here we will work with the transfor-
mations called τ and ρ in [12], which we alternatively call τ1 and τ2.
As shown in the aforementioned works, the translation function τ1 can be
used to correlate every metainference with an inference. That is to say, to
transform each metainference into an inference, by translating its set of premise-
inferences into a set of premise-formulae, and its conclusion-inference into a
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conclusion-formula.
Definition 16. The inference-correlate of a metainference token 〈{s1, ..., sn}, s〉
is the inference token 〈{τ1(s1), ...τ1(sn)}, τ1(s)〉
Interestingly, with these tools in hand (or some slight variation thereof), it
was recently shown that the set of valid metainferences of ST can be essentially
understood in terms of the set of valid inferences of LP—for each valid metain-
ference of ST has a corresponding valid inference-correlate that is valid in LP.
Similar results hold, in a straightforward manner, for TS and K3.
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Fact 17. A metainference token is locally valid in ST(respectively, in TS) if
and only if its inference-correlate is valid in LP (respectively, in K3).
Given the duality holding between LP and K3 one might expect to use this
fact, in addition to the representation results above, to establish the desired
duality between ST and TS—and, possibly, between Cut and Reflexivity.
However, if we want to pursue this line of reasoning, we immediately face
a technical problem. We cannot use τ2 to define the metainference-correlate of
an inference as straightforwardly as we used τ1 to define the inference-correlate
of a metainference—i.e., in a point-wise fashion. As we discussed earlier, the
reason is simply that frameworks for metainferences and inferences are usually
different. Thus, we need to adjust either the definition of duality for inferences
or the translation functions, in order to guarantee that we will always have one
object in the conclusions of metainferences. We detail below one way of doing
this.
Definition 18. The metainference-correlate of an inference token Γ ⇒ ∆ is
the metainference token 〈τ2(
∧
Γ), τ2(
∨
∆)〉, if ∆ 6= ∅, or 〈τ2(
∧
Γ), ∅ ⇒ ∅〉, if
∆ = ∅.
Given the way conjunction and disjunction work within the strong Kleene
algebra, this transformation preserves the desired connection between these four
non-classical logics, as is straightforward to see.
Fact 19. An inference token is valid in LP (respectively, in K3) if and only if
its metainference-correlate is locally valid in ST (respectively, in TS).
With these auxiliary results in mind we may now proceed to detail a some-
what derivative notion of duality, defined through transformation or translation
functions. According to this approach, for every metainference token, its dual
according to the previous translations is the metainferential-correlate of the dual
of its inference-correlate.
Definition 20. The translation-dual of a metainference token 〈{s1, . . . , sn}, s〉
is the metainference token 〈τ2(¬τ1(s)), τ2(¬τ1(s1) ∨ ... ∨ ¬τ1(sn))〉.
Putting all these facts together, we can finally connect ST with TS.
19The proofs of the following four facts can be easily adapted from [2], and [4]
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Theorem 21. A metainference token is valid in ST (respectively, in TS) if
and only if its translation-dual is valid in TS (respectively, in ST).
Let us mention a few reservations regarding some of the drawbacks that this
result has—all stemming from the fact that it took us such a roundabout way
to finally get to the desired destination.
Surely, the method is cumbersome and inelegant, as it depends too heavily on
the linguistic resources of the language. But this is not the only inconvenience—
that could be chalked up to the language, and not to the theory of duality. How-
ever, the finitary nature of both inferences and metainferences is characteristic
of the previously described notion of metainferential duality. With respect to
the former, inferences can only have finitely many premises, as well as finitely
many conclusions. In this vein, it shall be noted that this could be a desirable
feature of logical frameworks, sought either proof-theoretically or semantically,
i.e., through compactness. However, the present conception of duality assumes
this property by fiat, rather than arguing for it or showing that it is somehow
induced by other aspects of the formalism. With regard to the latter (that
is, with regard to metainferences) it is less clear whether the finite character
thereof is desirable or not. In any case, we would like to underline that the
present framework does not allow for a choice in this respect—thus being rather
sub-optimal from the point of view of having neutral playgrounds to work in.
More importantly, as we are trying to shed light on the connection between
ST and TS, translation-duality renders rather unhappy results regarding Cut
and Reflexivity. To wit, if we take one of the most simple (in the logical sense)
instances of Cut.
⇒ p p⇒
⇒
Notice that, according to the previous definitions, its translation-dual not only
is hardly reminiscent of Reflexivity, but worse, it is not a structural property
anymore—instead, it is a property of negation, or of the interaction between
negation and disjunction.
⇒ ⊥
⇒ ¬p ∨ ¬¬p
This seems quite unpleasant for someone trying to have an accurate under-
standing of metainferential duality.20 As highlighted by an anonymous reviewer,
it still is true that Cut and Reflexivity are duals up to logical equivalence—i.e.,
that the dual of each is logically equivalent to the other.
20In fact, this asymmetry is not particular to Cut, but present when we look at the dual
of every metainference which has more than one metainference-premise. A quick inspection
of the definitions shows that these sorts of metainferences will have duals with only one
metainference-conclusion, full of negations and disjunctions. However, if the notion of duality
that we are looking for will somehow illuminate the duality between structural features un-
derstood as schematic metainferences where no connective is explicitly mentioned, then the
outcome of this method is clearly unsatisfactory.
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Given that this is just the same result for our novel notion of metainferential
duality detailed in Section 4, one may wonder why our account could be said
to be superior to the translation approach. The answer to this is that the
translation account seems too focused on ST and TS, relying too much on
the aforementioned representation theorems for said substructural logics. It is
unclear, though, how well would this generalize to other substructural logics,
for which we do not have translation results of any sort. Indeed, excessively
focusing on this attempt (although somewhat efficient for the case of ST and
TS) could prove to leave out, e.g., the case of the duality between the smallest
non-transitive and the smallest non-reflexive logic. Given these considerations,
we think it is best to focus on our proposal for metainferential duality, which is
independent of object-language resources and representation results.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this article, we evaluated the extent to which one of the most important
notions of duality available in the literature, the so-called notion of negation
duality, can be applied to illuminate certain alleged dualities between substruc-
tural logics. In doing so, we focused on the much commented “intuitive” duality
between the non-transitive logic ST and the non-reflexive logic TS and, more
particularly, between Cut and Reflexivity. Our aim in discussing this issue
was to provide a deeper understanding of the notion of duality with respect
to substructural logics. In this respect, we showed that the negation duality
was unsatisfactory to elucidate the sense in which said substructural logics are
dual—for these systems ended up actually being self-duals. We also inspected
an indirect way of establishing this duality, through a detour on translation
functions, ultimately concluding that this was unsatisfactory too.
For these reasons, we thought there was a need to develop a novel no-
tion of duality, inspired in the notion of negation duality and considered as
a metainferential version thereof, which turned out to actually require a change
of framework. More concretely, we highlighted that an appropriate study of
the phenomenon of duality within the realm of substructural logics required
an extension of the framework that includes both positive and negative infer-
ences, together with metainferences that allowed multiple conclusions, as well
as multiple premises. Thus, within this framework, we developed a novel no-
tion of metainferential duality, which led us to finally show the intended duality
between ST and TS and—modulo equivalences—of Cut and Reflexivity.
These explorations, however, mark only the beginning of a series of questions
that should be answerable with the help of the tools developed above. Some
of these pertain to the duality of certain (schematic) metainferences, and of
some substructural logics. So, one could consider the other structural rules
like Contraction and Weakening, asking which metainferences are dual thereof.
According to our notion of metainferential duality, we obtain the following duals,
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respectively.21
Dual-Contraction:
Γ, ϕ⇒− ∆
Γ, ϕ, ϕ⇒− ∆
Γ⇒− ϕ,∆
Γ⇒− ϕ,ϕ,∆
Dual-Weakening:
Γ, ϕ⇒− ∆
Γ⇒− ∆
Γ⇒− ϕ,∆
Γ⇒− ∆
Both rules are valid metainferences in most logics, and a drastic modification
in the notion of validity is needed in order to invalidate them. Thus, one still
could insist on investigating whether there is an argument against these duals
and develop another notion of duality. We hope to investigate these issues in
future works. In a similar vein, we stressed that we hoped the above-developed
tools could illuminate the extent to which other logics, were dual to each other.
That is the case of subvaluationism and supervaluationism. Proving whether or
not the resulting logics are metainferentially dual to each other, in our technical
sense, is a deeply interesting task that we hope to tackle in the near future.
Finally, substructural logics have been recently subject to discussion also re-
garding the so-called generalized metainferences of arbitrarily great levels—that
is, metainferences of level 1 (inferences between inferences), metainferences of
level 2 (inferences between metainferences), and so on. In this respect, [4] de-
scribed a “hierarchy” of systems counting with logics that coincide with Classical
Logic up to a certain metainferential level n—that is, they share their metainfer-
ential validities. Moreover, [21] and [25] construct a parallel hierarchy of systems
counting with logics agreeing with Classical Logic up to a certain metainferen-
tial level n, in a rather different sense—that is, by sharing their metainferential
anti-validities. Whence, there is an intuitive sense in which these two hierarchies
(and each of the logics of each hierarchy for each metainferential level n) are
dual to each other. However, the notion of metainferential duality discussed in
the previous sections cannot explain this, as it is only devised for metainferences
of level 1. We conjecture, in this vein, that a generalization of the definition of
metainferential duality, for any metainferential level n, and a suitable modifica-
tion of the metainferential frameworks, may provide the expected results. We
hope to discuss these and other issues soon.
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